Expert Witness failed in Daubert Standard Testimony
Expert Testimony Failed to Meet Daubert Standard
Michael Rigney
December 29, 2011
Raymond Bielskis was an acoustical ceiling carpenter employed by International Decorators. Although International Decorators usually supplied Bielskis with scaffolding necessary for his projects, he did own a manufactured by Louisville Ladder that he used occasionally. One of those occasions was in March 2005. He was in the middle of a project when one of his co-workers borrowed the scaffold he was using. He brought in his mini-scaffold from his car, inspected it, and began to use it. He used it for several hours without incident. Then, without warning, it collapsed and he fell to the floor, sustaining injuries. He inspected the scaffold and noticed that one of the wheel stems had broken. Bielskis brought suit against Louisville Ladder, alleging counts based on strict liability and negligence. Louisville Ladder filed a third-party complaint against International Decorators for contribution. Bielskis retained Neil Mizen as his expert. In his report, Mizen concluded that the wheel stem failed because of a "brittle fracture" caused by excess tensile stress due to over tightening the stem. He further opined that the fracture could have been avoided with an alternative mechanism or by simply not tightening it as much. Louisville's expert examined the fracture surface carefully and did extensive testing and reconstruction. He also concluded that the stem failed because of a brittle fracture. He concluded, however, that the wheel was too loose, not too tight. Louisville moved to exclude Mizen's testimony. Judge Leinenweber (N.D. Ill.) agreed, concluding that Mizen's testimony failed under the Daubert factors. He excluded the testimony and granted summary judgment to Louisville. Bielskis appeals.
In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Evans (who, as a result of his death, took no part in the decision) affirmed. The Court first addressed and resolved a jurisdictional matter. The district court’s order did not resolve the third party complaint brought against International Decorators and thus was technically not a final judgment. The Court concluded, however, that the summary judgment order in Louisville's favor resolved Louisville's third-party claim for all practical purposes and concluded the district court litigation. The Court turned to the merits. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the district court must ensure that an expert's methodology is scientifically reliable. Daubert set out a number of factors addressed to an expert’s theory: has it been tested, has it been subjected to peer review, what is its rate of error, and what is its level of acceptance. The district court's evaluation is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The Court conceded that it was a close question, but ultimately found no abuse of discretion. It relied on several facts: plaintiff’s expert made no attempt to test his theory (Louisville's expert tested extensively), Mizen presented no evidence of the level of acceptance or rate of error of his conclusion, and his proposed alternatives were not supported by any engineering principles. In short, Mizen's opinion was long on speculation and short on fact. The Court went on to conclude that the district court did not err in denying Bielskis’ motion for continuance to obtain a new expert. Again, the Court considered it a close call but concluded that the district court did not abuse of discretion in managing its docket that way. Finally, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Louisville. Although acknowledging that expert testimony may not be necessary in all product liability cases, it was required here. The scaffold had been in Bielskis’ control for years and there was no evidence regarding its condition when it left Louisville. There was also little evidence of its use while under Bielskis’ control. Bielskis could not prevail without expert testimony on those issues.
SOURCE: www.lexology.com